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WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DENIAL 
OF MEANINGFUL DUE PROCESS IN SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN OHIO 
GENEVIEVE VINCE* 
ABSTRACT  
Students face many different obstacles in school and arbitrary exclusion should 
not be one of them. Despite the Supreme Court stating that students do not shed their 
rights at the schoolhouse gate, they in fact do shed their rights. This Note examines 
how school disciplinary actions deny students meaningful due process. It discusses 
the foundation of modern due process, including what other rights have been 
incorporated into the contemporary understanding of due process as well as its 
historic roots. Additionally, this Note explores the case that established the 
procedures required of school administrators to comport with a student’s right to due 
process, Goss v. Lopez. Finally, this Note argues why Goss’s protections do not 
amount to meaningful due process and how denial of meaningful due process in 
school disciplinary actions can have lasting negative implications on students’ 
futures beyond the schoolhouse gate.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a citizen being denied meaningful due process merely because she 
belongs to a certain class of people. When the citizen is accused of an offense, 
authority figures need not listen to what the accused has to say because truly 
examining the situation would be too time consuming. The law permits the authority 
figure to act as judge and jury and quickly dispose of the matter without scrutinizing 
the facts presented. Authority figures can hand citizens a punishment that remains on 
their record and affects their future. The citizen can appeal the punishment; however, 
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her appellate rights are not meaningful either, as the appellate panel is more than 
willing to defer to the authority figure’s judgment. Now, the punishment is 
permanently on the citizen’s record and follows her throughout life, thereby 
hampering opportunities and making it harder for her to succeed. Imagine a world 
where state and federal law implements this discrimination and makes this form of 
discrimination legal. 
This is infuriating, right? It sounds like a story straight out of pre-civil rights 
America. Except, it is not. This is a modern phenomenon that affects citizens every 
day. But in the year 2017, with the internet, social media, and activists galore, how 
could an injustice like this go unnoticed? Furthermore, where is this happening, to 
whom is this happening, and why do so few know or seem to care about it? It is 
closer than one would think; in fact, most people have probably seen or heard stories 
like this without realizing it involved class discrimination. So, who is this class of 
people? The class of people is minor students, and the discrimination they face lurks 
behind news stories such as “8th grader Suspended for Kool-Aid, Sugar, ‘Crack;’” 
“12-year-old boy Suspended for Staring at a Girl;” and “Parents Sue School, Police 
over High School Students’ Rap Video Expulsions.”1    
While the headlines seem irrational, stories like these are surprisingly common.2 
Each story involves a student excluded from school for something trivial, and these 
disproportionate actions are all made possible, not through state or federal law, but 
via the 1975 Supreme Court case Goss v. Lopez.3 Goss established that access to 
public education is a property interest that the Fourteenth Amendment protects.4 The 
Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from a government body, such as 
administrators in a publicly funded school,5 to deprive citizens of their life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.6 However, this protection is not absolute. 
The U.S. Constitution permits the government to deprive an individual of life, 
liberty, or property so long as the state actor affords the individual due process of the 
law.7 Therefore, when a school suspends or expels a student for prohibited behavior, 
the disciplinary action qualifies as a government body depriving an individual of his 
                                                          
 1  Michael Baldwin, 12-Year-Old Boy Suspended for Staring at Girl, FOX19.COM (Sept. 
30, 2015), http://www.fox19.com/story/30158100/12-year-old-boy-suspended-for-staring-at-
girl; Homa Bash, 8th Grader Suspended for Kool-Aid, Sugar ‘Crack’, NEWSNET5 CLEVELAND 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.newsnet5.com/news/local-news/oh-summit/8th-grader-
suspended-for-kool-aid-sugar-crack; Lucy May, Parents Sue Cincinnati-Area School District, 
Police Over High School Students’ Rap Video Expulsion, WCPO CINCINNATI (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.wcpo.com/news/local-news/parents-sue-northwest-local-schools-colerain-police-
over-high-school-students-rap-video-expulsions. 
 2  When searching Google News for “student suspended for,” several of the news stories 
recalled took place in Ohio. Other well represented states included Texas, Virginia, and South 
Carolina. 
 3  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975). 
 4  Id. at 574. 
 5  Id.; see W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943). 
 6  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 7  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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or her property.8 Accordingly, Goss held that students facing exclusion were entitled 
to due process of law.  
Goss established two procedural requirements that schools must follow to 
suspend or expel a student while comporting with the student’s constitutional right to 
due process. 9 These procedural requirements, however, amount to no more than 
inconvenient administrative red tape masquerading as substantive student 
protections. This deception results in such headlines that highlight unreasonable, 
illogical, and arbitrary justifications for excluding a student from school. Goss does 
not protect students as originally intended. Instead, the case allows schools to 
truncate the students’ constitutional right to due process.   
This Note will show that students are unfairly denied meaningful due process of 
law when facing disciplinary actions at school. Part II will discuss the history of due 
process as well as important concepts absorbed into the contemporary definition. 
Part III will explore the history of Goss v. Lopez, including the Court’s established 
protections and concerns raised in the dissent. Part IV will analyze the practical 
application of Goss and illustrate how the procedures created in the majority opinion 
permit schools to unfairly deprive students of their property without meaningful due 
process of law. Additionally, Part IV will highlight the seriousness of school 
disciplinary actions and how truncating students’ right to due process hurts their 
future. Finally, Part V will propose a solution to protect students where the 
procedures created by Goss fall short.  
II. DUE PROCESS 
The phrase “due process” first appeared in English statutes interpreting the 
Magna Carta in 1354 A.D.10 Originally, due process was only a technical 
requirement.11 Due process mandated that the court provide an accused party with 
notice of a hearing regarding an issue in contention so that the accused could 
respond to the accusation.12 Over time, the definition and implications of due process 
changed as the idea absorbed additional concepts.13 In the United States, due process 
absorbed several concepts from the Bill of Rights in an effort to ensure the 
meaningfulness of an accused party’s legal response.14 Furthermore, due process 
incorporated the principles of legality, which assured that laws were fair 
                                                          
 8  Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 9  Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-84.  
 10  A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 14-15 (1964). 
 11  Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. 
COMMENT. 339, 340 (1987). 
 12  Gary Lawson, Due Process Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 439, 
439-40 (David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., rev. 2d ed. 2014). 
 13  See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due 
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 585 (2009). 
 14  Francis W. Bird, Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 46 (1913). 
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commands.15 By including the concepts that protected the rights of the accused party, 
due process shifted from a technical procedure into an amorphous concept that 
became synonymous with a “fair trial.”16 Notice, protections from the Bill of Rights, 
and the principles of legality weave the pattern currently known as due process.  
A. The Principles of Legality: The Quality Assurance of Law  
The principles of legality are rules and reasons that make commands legally 
binding.17 These principles establish that laws are fair in nature when they are clear 
and ascertainable.18 Indeed, to uphold the integrity of laws, the decision maker 
cannot use discretion to depart from previously established and agreed upon rules.19 
In practicality, the principles of legality encompass all the reasons why the Court 
would strike down a law as substantively unfair, flawed, and unconstitutional.20 For 
example, one principle requires that a law be publicly promulgated.21 Secret decrees 
cannot be laws because people have no notice as to what behaviors the law 
prohibits.22    
Another principle states that a law cannot be arbitrary; it must be rational or 
rationally related to the purpose of the law.23 If, for example, a law intends to prevent 
highway accidents by prohibiting trucks from hauling two trailers but statistics show 
that trucks hauling one trailer cause significantly more accidents than trucks hauling 
two trailers, the law is arbitrary because the means employed do not achieve the 
stated purpose of the law.24 A law that employs means unrelated to the end sought is 
irrational. Accordingly, that law would violate a principle of legality.25   
                                                          
 15  Lawson, supra note 12, at 439-40. 
 16  See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 564 (1972); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 260-71 (1970); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 200-01 (1951); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating a Nebraska state law prohibiting teachers from teaching the 
German language to students who had not yet passed the eighth grade because the law was 
“arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any legitimate state goal”); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915); ICC v. Louisville & 
Ashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No., 108, 111 U.S. 
701, 707 (1884); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 281-86 
(1856). 
 17  John C. Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 
493, 530-43 (1997).  
 18  Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 355, 356-59 (2005). 
 19  Id. at 375-77. 
 20  Harrison, supra note 17, at 525-43; see generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW (rev. ed. 1969). 
 21  FULLER, supra note 20, at 157-59. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Harrison, supra note 17, at 499-501. 
 24  Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 694 (1981).  
 25  Id. at 662; Lawson, supra note 12, at 439-40; Harrison, supra note 17, at 530. 
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Yet another principle of legality is that a law must be crafted so that the public is 
able to comply with it.26 If the people cannot comply with a law and are accordingly 
guilty from the start, people lack adequate notice, and the law would violate a 
principle of legality.27 Furthermore, a law can be void for vagueness.28 If a law is so 
convoluted in its wording that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand 
what it binds him or her to do or not to do, that law is void for vagueness.29 Similar 
to the way secret decrees violate the principles of legality for not providing the 
public with notice as to what behaviors are prohibited, a statute held to be void for 
vagueness does not provide adequate notice as to what behaviors are prohibited.30    
Going further, the law must be capable of faithful administration and 
implementation. When crafted, a law cannot leave significant discretion to law 
enforcement because significant discretion results in inconsistent application, 
creating arbitrary and irrational results. 31 This inconsistency fails to comport with a 
principle of legality and ultimately fails the due process requirement of the law.32 
Each of these principles helps expand and illustrate the idea of contemporary 
American due process. These elements are required of a law to make it a fair 
command, so the public can comply with it.    
B. Natural Law: The Root of Fairness 
The rationale at the root of due process lies within the concept of natural law. 
The idea of natural law began as far back as Aristotle who stated that if one were to 
look at the nature of the human being with all its complexities and nuances, one 
would see an intrinsic order of purposefulness or reason that guides one’s choices.33 
This purposefulness is free will, which is a crucial aspect of natural law.34 The rule 
of law should respect natural law.35 When the rule of law respects natural law, 
citizens, of their own free will, enter into a covenant with the government by which 
the citizens agree to abide by the laws so long as the laws continue to respect natural 
                                                          
 26  FULLER, supra note 20, at 130-31. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Robinson, supra note 18, at 356-63. 
 29  Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 
U. PA. L. REV. 67, 67-68 (1960). 
 30  Id. 
 31  FULLER, supra note 20, at 209-12. 
 32  Id. 
 33  See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA 
OF THEOLOGY (1266-1273), reprinted in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS: A 
NEW TRANSLATION, BACKGROUNDS, INTERPRETATIONS (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., Norton 
critical ed. 1988). 
 34  Kent Greenfield, Free Will Paradigms, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2011). 
 35  See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 33; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 33. 
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law.36 A respectful law acknowledges the values, norms, and rules by which a human 
should be treated and respected.37  
The most famous enumeration of rights rooted in natural law is the Declaration 
of Independence. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the basic values, 
norms, and rules of personhood that the government is to respect.38 Humanity in its 
nature demands life be respected and that people have the liberty to permit reason to 
guide their choices.39 The pursuit of happiness is how people develop themselves 
into more perfect beings.40 Natural law holds that there are these certain attributes to 
personhood that are inalienable, irreducible, and cannot arbitrarily be taken away.41   
As Chief Justice John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, “The government of 
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of 
men.”42 If a law does not respect natural law, it is a command demanding 
subservience without an agreed upon justification. Such a law is the arbitrary rule of 
man and not within the terms of the agreement between the people and the U.S. 
government.43 The agreement to respect natural law is the very root of the rule of 
law, the principles of legality, and ultimately, due process to which all citizens are 
entitled—that is, until Goss v. Lopez in 1975.  
III. GOSS V. LOPEZ 
Goss v. Lopez, originally hailed as a seminal case for students’ rights, created 
procedures that failed to protect students from a school’s arbitrary disciplinary 
actions.44 In Goss, the school gave nine students each a ten-day suspension for 
destruction of school property and disruption of a learning environment.45 Ohio state 
law required school administrators to provide procedural due process to any students 
facing suspension longer than ten days.46 The required procedure both consisted of 
notice no later than twenty-four hours from the time of the disciplinary action that 
stated the reason for the suspension and required administrators to provide students 
with an informal hearing regarding the conduct that led to the suspension.47 Ohio law 
                                                          
 36  See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 33; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 33. 
 37  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 164 (1803); see also Kevin F. Ryan, We Hold 
These Truths, 31 WTR VT. B.J. 9, 11 (2005-2006). 
 38  Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in our 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
457, 470 (2011).  
 39  RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 41-43 
(1998); Charles, supra note 38, at 506. 
 40  BARNETT, supra note 39, at 73; Charles, supra note 38, at 477-502. 
 41  Charles, supra note 38, at 481-82. 
 42 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 164; see Ryan, supra note 37, at 11. 
 43  See generally HENRY THOMAS, THE LIVING WORLD OF PHILOSOPHY (1946).   
 44  MARY A. LENTZ, LENTZ SCHOOL SECURITY § 1:4, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 
2014). 
 45  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 568 (1975). 
 46  Id. at 567. 
 47  Id. at 596 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/9
2017] WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 265 
 
further required school administrators to notify the student of his or her right to 
appeal the decision to the school board.48   
This particular Ohio law, however, was silent on any procedural requirements for 
students facing suspensions of ten days or less.49 Because the students in Goss were 
suspended for ten days, state law did not require the school to provide the students 
with procedural due process.50 The students filed suit seeking a declaration that the 
statute, which permitted the school to deny them procedural due process, was 
unconstitutional.51 The students also sought to enjoin the school from issuing other 
suspensions that under the same law would not be entitled to procedural due 
process.52 The district court held that the statute in question violated the students’ 
constitutional right to due process and granted both the declaration and injunction.53 
The school board appealed the decision all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.54 
The school board’s main argument was that any suspension lasting ten days or less 
only constituted a de minimis deprivation of property and was not substantial enough 
to require procedural due process.55 
In a narrow 5-4 decision striking down the statute, the Court stated that not 
affording the students with a hearing before handing down the suspensions violated 
their rights to due process of law prior to deprivation of life, liberty, or property.56 
The Court reasoned that “entitlement to a public education” is a property interest, 
and, as a property interest, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protected students from the state arbitrarily depriving them of that property interest.57 
The Court reasoned that even though Ohio was not constitutionally obligated to 
“establish and maintain a public school system,” the fact that the state offered and 
mandated attendance created a legal entitlement that a government body, such as the 
school board, could not arbitrarily withdraw “absent fundamentally fair procedures 
to determine whether the misconduct has occurred.”58 Overall, Goss provided further 
                                                          
 48  Id. at 567 (majority opinion); see OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015). 
 49  OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015).  
 50  Goss, 419 U.S. at 571. 
 51  Id. at 568-69. 
 52  Id. at 569. 
 53  Id. at 571. 
 54  “Because the order below granted plaintiffs’ request for an injunction—ordering 
defendants to expunge their records—this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1253.” Id. at 572.  
 55  Id. at 575-76.  
 56  Id. at 584. 
 57  Id. at 574. While the Court has been more uniform when determining what interests 
constitute deprivation of life, the interests that qualify as liberty or property have been a gray 
area. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). 
 58  Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
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affirmation that students retain their constitutional protections while they are in 
school.59   
Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice 
Rehnquist joined, dissented, stating that the majority’s decision was an intrusion into 
the operation of public schools and opened a door for judicial intervention which had 
the potential to “affect adversely the quality of education.”60 Justice Powell first 
argued that public education was not a right but rather an entitlement.61 As an 
entitlement, students did not have a right to procedural due process outside of what 
state law created for them.62 Furthermore, even if access to education was a right, 
students did not possess the right to discipline-free education.63 Thus, schools not 
providing students with notice and a hearing before disciplining them would not 
truly violate their right to education.64   
Justice Powell then argued that the procedures described in the majority opinion 
would unduly burden schools to the point of dysfunction.65 Justice Powell stated that 
school boards have great swaths of disciplinary discretion because each school 
operates in a different community that has different needs.66 Justice Powell argued 
that to serve a school’s diverse set of needs in maintaining discipline, school boards 
need to have significant amounts of discretion regarding their disciplinary policies.67 
Justice Powell further argued that “one-size-fits-all” types of policies tie the hands of 
the administrators.68 He alluded to the fact that some schools implement more 
disciplinary actions than average and that by requiring staff to provide notice and 
                                                          
 59  Id. The first seminal case for student civil rights was Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Comty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, several students filed suit seeking damages 
and an injunction against enforcement of a rule created by their school’s principal prohibiting 
the students from wearing black armbands. The students along with other adults in the 
community decided to demonstrate their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam by all wearing 
black armbands on a particular day. The school principal learned of the plan and established 
the rule prohibiting students from wearing the armbands. When the students wore their 
armbands anyway, they were suspended “until they would come back without their 
armbands.” Id. at 504. The Court held that the school had no evidence that wearing the 
armbands would have caused a substantial disruption of the learning environment and absent 
such evidence, the arbitrary prohibition violated the students’ right to expression under the 
First Amendment. The Court reasoned that “it can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.” Id. at 506.   
 60  Goss, 419 U.S. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 61  Id. at 586. 
 62  Id. at 586-89.  
 63  Id. at 586. 
 64  Id. at 587-89. 
 65  Id. at 591-92. 
 66  “In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized that school authorities must 
have broad discretionary authority in the daily operations of public schools. This includes 
wide latitude with respect to maintaining discipline and good order.” Id. at 589-90. 
 67  Id. at 591-92. 
 68  Id. at 592-93. 
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conduct a hearing, the disciplinary actions would pile up and require more attention; 
attention which would be taken away from providing the other students with a 
quality education.69   
 Furthermore, Justice Powell argued that the requirements set forth in the 
majority opinion would not protect students the way the majority thought it would.70 
Justice Powell stated that the statute the majority had just invalidated provided more 
protection to students than the Court’s new procedures ever could.71 Under the 
invalidated law, the principal taking the disciplinary action was required to notify not 
just the student, but also the student’s parents and the school district’s board of 
education.72 Under the Goss majority, schools only have to notify the student.73 
Justice Powell further argued that the hearing Goss afforded to students would not 
provide more protection than was already available, as the majority opinion did not 
change the substance of what would constitute an appropriate hearing.74 Finally, 
Justice Powell noted that even if a student were subjected to an arbitrary suspension 
of ten days or less, that time period would not be substantial enough to justify 
additional protection and that such an action could easily be remedied without 
involving the judiciary.75  
More than forty years have passed since the Court decided Goss, and 
unfortunately, many of the concerns raised by Justice Powell in his dissent were 
accurate.76 Goss was touted as a major win for students’ rights when in reality it has 
not resulted in real protections for students.77   Besides affirming prior cases holding 
that students had civil rights while in school, the practical application of the hearing 
and notice requirements established under Goss have shown that students do in fact 
shed some of their civil rights at the school house gate.78 The notice and hearing 
                                                          
 69  “[The majority opinion] also demonstrate[s] that if hearings were required for a 
substantial percentage of short-term suspensions, school authorities would have time to do 
little else.” Id. at 592.  
 70  Id. at 595-97. 
 71  Id. at 596. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at 595-96. 
 75  Id. at 589 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Brannon Heath, Constitutional Law: Goss v. 
Lopez: Much Ado About Nothing or the Tempest, 7 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 193 (1976). 
 76  Michael A. Ellis, Procedural Due Process after Goss v. Lopez, 1976 DUKE L.J. 409, 
430 (1976) (arguing that the Court’s reluctance to adopt true procedural protections due to the 
potential burden on the school administration dilutes the importance of procedural due process 
in that the truncated procedural due process sends the message to students that their right to 
due process need not be taken seriously). 
 77  Powell’s statement that arbitrary actions are easily remedied without judicial 
intervention has turned out to be untrue as seen by the mass quantities of case law and 
anecdotes regarding the subject.  
 78  Id.; see Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 63 F. Supp. 3d 418, 448-50 (M.D. Pa. 2014) 
(holding that procedural due process rights were not violated by not affording an “informal 
give-and-take” before dismissing a student); see also Stafford Mun. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 64 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
268 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:259 
 
requirements described in Goss do not substantively protect students.79 The 
requirements merely created administrative red tape.   
IV. STUDENTS SHED THEIR RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL DUE PROCESS AT THE SCHOOL 
HOUSE GATE  
To illustrate the full effect of Goss’s shortcomings, let us follow a hypothetical 
disciplinary action from start to end. Imagine that Susy, a senior in high school, is 
from Ohio and is generally regarded as a good student. One day, Susy’s classmate 
takes her purse and discharges Susy’s pepper spray. Susy’s teacher instructs her to 
go to the principal’s office. Once in the office, Susy is told to write down what 
happened and given the opportunity to call her parents. Once her parents arrive, the 
principal, vice principal, and guidance counselor inform Susy and her parents that 
Susy is being suspended for disruption of class and that Susy has a right to appeal 
the decision to the school board. 
In this situation, the first questions a parent might ask are, “How can I fight 
this?” or “What can I do to remedy the situation?” You believe the action is arbitrary 
because pepper spray is a legal substance. Susy was not the person who discharged 
the canister. Indeed, the student code of conduct does not explicitly or implicitly ban 
the substance. After all, how could Susy have known she was not permitted to 
possess the pepper spray if she had no prior notice? You notify the school of your 
intention to appeal the suspension. You go through the appeals process, and the 
principal informs you that the school board upheld the suspension. You feel your 
child’s rights were violated but are unaware of what specific right was violated. The 
only recourse left would be to sue the school. Surely there has to be something—
some cause of action for which you and your daughter are entitled relief! But what 
relief? Let us examine the process established in Goss to see what rights could be 
violated, how they could be violated, and where in the disciplinary process the 
violation could occur.  
Recall that in Goss v. Lopez, the Court held that “entitlement to a public 
education” is a legally enforceable property interest, and as a property interest, the 
Due Process Clause protects students from the state arbitrarily depriving them of 
their property.80 The Court further stated that a governmental body, such as the 
school board, could not arbitrarily withdraw that right based on misconduct “absent 
fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether [the requisite] misconduct has 
occurred.”81 Therefore, in order for a school to withdraw a student’s right to public 
education through disciplinary suspension, the school must provide “fundamentally 
fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred.”82 This restriction 
over the school raises the question of what constitutes fundamentally fair procedures. 
                                                                                                                                         
S.W.3d 559 (Tex. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that the school’s failure to inform the student of a 
right to appeal did not violate due process). 
 79  See Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 447-48; see also Stafford, 64 S.W.3d at 559; see also 
Grine v. Sylvania Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. L-04-1137, 2004 WL 2924335, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 6393 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2004). 
 80  Goss, 419 U.S. at 565; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 81  Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015); see also Stafford, 64 
S.W.3d at 559; Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (1972). 
 82  Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
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Upon determination that any removal from school constituted deprivation of 
property, regardless of the extent or duration, the Court established what 
fundamentally fair procedures look like in the school removal context.83 The Court 
reasoned that due process is rooted in “the opportunity to be heard” and the 
opportunity to be heard only arises if “one is informed that the matter is pending.”84 
History has agreed with this concept and expanded upon it by incorporating other 
procedural protections, such as the right to counsel or the right to a jury trial, under 
the due process umbrella.85 After all, notice is worthless if the rules of court are such 
that the answer of the accused cannot be effectively heard. Based on this principle, 
the Court held that students facing out-of-school suspension must be given “some 
kind of notice” of the reason for the possible property deprivation and “some kind of 
hearing” regarding the validity of the deprivation.86    
“Some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing” are the two components of 
fundamentally fair procedure; however, the majority opinion never addressed what 
either means.87 Because neither of these procedural requirements was adequately 
defined in Goss, subsequent case law has shaped what appropriate notice and hearing 
for school disciplinary actions look like.88    
A. Some Kind of Notice 
As it currently stands, “some kind of notice” means that the school must inform 
the student what behavior or action justifies the suspension.89 The student code of 
conduct need not explicitly state that this specific behavior is prohibited.90 So long as 
                                                          
 83  The administration in Goss argued that even if public education was a property interest 
protected by due process, the procedural requirements only come into play when the student is 
facing a “severe detriment or grievous loss,” and that a ten-day suspension was not severe 
enough to require due process. Id. at 576, 583-84. 
 84  Id. at 579; see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Joint Anti-Fascist 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-69 (1951); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Tr. Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). 
 85  See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 
313 (1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 
(1967); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see also 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 86  Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. 
 87  Id. at 579; see also Ellis, supra note 76, at 422-30; Heath, supra note 75, at 206-10. 
 88  “It also appears . . . that the . . . content of the notice . . . will depend on appropriate 
accommodation of the competing interests involved.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 579; see also 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 
895 (1961). 
 89  See C.Y. ex rel. Antone v. Lakeview Pub. Sch., 557 F. App’x 426 (6th Cir. 2014); see 
also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 
2000); Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 90  See Krista Gesaman, Student Media Guide to Due Process Claims, STUDENT PRESS 
LAW CTR., http://www.splc.org/article/2014/11/due-process-claims (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
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the school administration deems the student’s behavior to reasonably fall within a 
certain category, the act of informing a student of the code that he or she violated is 
sufficient notice.91 This is far removed from the modern definition of due process.92 
Technical due process requires notice; however, contemporary due process requires 
the notice to be meaningful.93 Modern due process includes procedural safeguards 
from the Bill of Rights and the principles of legality into the notice requirement so 
that an accused party may have his or her answer heard effectively, making that 
answer meaningful.94 The notice requirement under Goss is not meaningful. It moves 
away from the incorporation trend by permitting schools to deny students basic 
procedural safeguards.95 Notice of a disciplinary action under Goss does not provide 
the accused with the procedurally fair trial that due process has come to mean 
today.96 
“Some kind of notice” raises a second tangential issue. Goss held that notice is 
required and that the notice must tell students why they are being suspended.97 
However, suspensions become news headlines because of the severe punishment 
arising from a seemingly trivial offense that most likely never actually appeared in 
the student code of conduct. This pattern raises the question as to why school 
administrators are given substantial discretion in determining what constitutes 
prohibited behavior in the first place. 
 The Goss majority and dissenting opinions highlighted the need for school 
boards of education and administrators to have wide swaths of discretion so that the 
unique needs of each school could be adequately served.98 The results of such 
                                                          
 91  Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 78 F. Supp. 2d 812 (C.D. Ill. 
2000), aff’d, 251 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 92  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (stating that the very nature and spirit of the U.S. 
government as well as the general principles of law and reason forbid ex post facto laws which 
are “law[s] that punish[] a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for an act, which, 
when done was in violation of no existing law”). 
 93  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). A fundamental component of due process is 
the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
 94  See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 
313 (1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 
(1967); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 95  Benjamin E. Friedman, Protecting Truth: An Argument for Juvenile Rights and a 
Return to In re Gault, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 165, 166-67 (2011). 
 96  In fact, allowing administrators to punish students for violating the code of conduct for 
conduct that is not actually included in the code is arguably an ex post facto law in that it 
“criminalizes” behaviors after the fact. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). How is a 
student supposed to fully comply with the code of conduct if certain behaviors are not listed? 
 97  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). 
 98  Id. at 584, 592-94. Upon research into Ohio’s laws, Ohio Department of Education 
regulations, and the county boards of education, state law is the only guidance that local 
school boards have when creating their codes of conduct. Neither the Department of 
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discretion are codes of conduct, which enumerate prohibited “categories” of 
behavior for which a student could be suspended or expelled; these categories are so 
generalized and ambiguous that any conduct could potentially fall within one.99 For 
example, many codes of conduct prohibit aiding and abetting, disrespect, disruptive 
behavior, insubordination, unauthorized materials, and unauthorized touching.100 
While codes of conduct attempt to define each infraction, the definitions still fall 
short of giving a student adequate and meaningful notice as to what behaviors and 
actions are prohibited.101  
If one were to compare student codes of conduct, one would notice that the 
definitions of these prohibited categories of behavior are comparable but encompass 
different behaviors at different schools. For example, Susy’s pepper spray incident 
occurred in Ohio. If Susy attended Revere High School in northeastern Ohio, she 
could be suspended because Revere’s definition of “Fireworks/Dangerous 
Instruments or Materials” actually includes possession and use of pepper spray.”102 If 
Susy attended Hamilton Township High School near Columbus, the school could 
suspend her for “disruption of school or class,” “inducing panic or reckless 
behavior,” or for possessing “weapons/dangerous instruments.”103 If Susy attended 
                                                                                                                                         
Education nor the county boards of education have much—if any—say in the substantive 
content that goes into a school’s code of conduct. 
 99  This would be like the Ohio Revised Code including a law that made it a crime to 
“harm people with a baseball bat.” That leaves several questions as to what constitutes 
harming a person. Does morally offending someone count as harming a person? How about 
simply making someone slightly uncomfortable? Depending on who is enforcing the law at 
the time, that executive official could subjectively believe moral offense and uncomfortable 
feelings fall under the umbrella and arrest someone for “harming a person with a baseball 
bat.” There is simply no notice and the statute is far too overbroad. 
 100  GREENVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY, 
GREENVILLE, OHIO (2015); IRONTON CITY SCHOOLS, IRONTON HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT/PARENT 
HANDBOOK, IRONTON, OHIO (2015); REVERE LOCAL SCHOOLS, REVERE HIGH SCHOOL 
STUDENT HANDBOOK, RICHFIELD, OHIO (2015); HAMILTON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
HAMILTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, COLUMBUS, OHIO (2015); 
MARIETTA CITY SCHOOLS, MARIETTA HIGH SCHOOL HANDBOOK, MARIETTA, OHIO (2015). 
Each of these five schools was picked on two conditions; each needed to have between 800-
1000 students, as well as be from one of the four corners, or sides of Ohio, with one from 
Columbus. 
 101  For example, the Revere High School Handbook states that students are prohibited 
from the “unauthorized use and/or distribution of over-the-counter medication.” REVERE HIGH 
SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100. However, nowhere in the handbook does it 
state what “authorized use” is. Accordingly, a student could potentially be suspended for 
taking his or her own Motrin for a headache or giving Midol to a friend for menstrual cramps. 
And for that matter, what is authorized touching? 
 102  Pepper spray was only added to the student code of conduct for the first time beginning 
in the 2009-2010 school year. Id. at 16, 20; REVERE LOCAL SCHOOLS, REVERE HIGH SCHOOL 
STUDENT HANDBOOK, RICHFIELD, OHIO (2009); REVERE LOCAL SCHOOLS, REVERE HIGH 
SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, RICHFIELD, OHIO (2008). 
 103  Notably, Hamilton Township High School also lists “holding hands” as an example of 
a prohibited display of affection. Thus, technically, a student could be suspended for holding 
hands with another student. Displays of Affection, in HAMILTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL 
STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 23. 
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Greenville High School in western Ohio, the school would suspend her for 
possession of a dangerous weapon on campus, as pepper spray is likely what the 
board of education contemplated when the board prohibited “possession of noxious 
irritation or poisonous gas.”104  
These differences are concerning because if a state law lacked uniformity to a 
similar degree as these codes of conduct do, the law would be struck down for lack 
of due process (i.e., the law fails to provide adequate notice and is thus unfair).105 
The principles of legality at the root of modern due process require laws to be 
rational, not arbitrary, able to be obeyed, and faithfully or equally applied. This lack 
of uniformity is not rational. The true definition of what constitutes aiding and 
abetting does not change based on a school’s regional needs. Either a student helped 
another student violate the code of conduct or not. There is no need to give a school 
discretion in defining such offenses.106 Because it is irrational, it is also arbitrary and 
difficult for students to obey.107  
Furthermore, students should be able to rely on public schools as government 
institutions to prohibit substantially similar—if not identical—behaviors in their 
codes of conduct.108 The fact that different schools define their offenses differently, 
combined with the amount of individual discretion that determines whether or not an 
offense was committed, results in unequal and, frankly, unfaithful administration of 
these school codes.109 Pepper spray is an excellent example. It is a common and legal 
personal safety device in the state of Ohio.110 How would a student know that a legal 
substance was banned in his or her school without adequate notice? While it is 
understandable that schools want to prohibit its presence on campus due to the 
possibility of it discharging, schools cannot ignore the fact that crime can happen 
                                                          
 104  Furthermore, pepper spray is prohibited from the Greenville High School campus 
entirely and thus, a student can be punished for having pepper spray in their car. Possession of 
Dangerous Weapons on Campus, in GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 
29. 
 105  See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (stating unconstitutionally vague 
statutes fail to define offenses with sufficient particularity and fail to encourage non-arbitrary 
enforcement); see also Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-
95 (1982) (holding that a statute must be vague in all of its applications in order to be 
considered unconstitutionally void for vagueness). 
 106  It would be like each school publishing its own dictionary of the English language. 
 107  Harrison, supra note 17, at 499-501. 
 108  “Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice, does more 
than simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it also 
helps to assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence 
of law itself.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996).  
 109  Daniel Losen et al., Are We Closing the School Discipline Gap?, CTR. FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS REMEDIES 1 (Feb. 2015) (stating that there is “tremendous disparity in the risk for 
suspension according to students’ race, gender, and disability status”); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Issue Brief No. 1, in CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION DATA 
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1 (Mar. 2014) (“Black students are suspended and expelled at 
a rate three times greater than white students”). 
 110  Note that pepper spray is not legally a dangerous weapon in Ohio. See OHIO REV. CODE 
§ 2923.11(2015).  
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anywhere. Suburban school districts are not exempt.111 Just because a school parking 
lot has lights does not mean that Susy is safe when she walks to her car after the sun 
goes down.112   
B. Some Kind of Hearing 
The other area where Goss is severely lacking is the requirement for “some kind 
of hearing.” The hearing requirement is just as ambiguous and ineffective as the 
notice requirement. In the majority opinion for Goss, Justice White noted that 
procedural due process stems from the “opportunity to be heard.”113 Thus far, “the 
opportunity to be heard” has become the sole requirement for “some kind of 
hearing.”114 So long as a school’s administration permits the student to make a 
statement, the hearing requirement of due process is met.115 “[O]nce school 
administrators tell a student what they heard or saw, ask why they heard or saw it, 
and allow a brief response, a student has received all the process that the Fourteenth 
Amendment demands.”116  
Furthermore, this “hearing” does not require school administrators to scrutinize 
the events that allegedly took place.117 In criminal law, a hearing that comports with 
the defendant’s due process rights involves the accused having a chance to face and 
question his or her accuser, providing witnesses to corroborate the defendant’s 
version of events, and having the burden of proof rest with the prosecution to prove 
that the accused violated the law.118 A hearing in the school context does not require 
the administration to truly examine the alleged series of events. Nor does the hearing 
even permit students to provide witnesses to corroborate their version of events. 
Thus, the “hearing” becomes a game of what the staff member says versus what the 
                                                          
 111  See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE 
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2014 (2015). 
 112  Car Jacking, Kidnapping, High School Parking Lot Robbery Suspect Arrested, 
TRISTATE HOMEPAGE (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www. tristatehomepage.com/news/news-
carousel/car-jacking-kidnapping-high-school-parking-lot-robbery-suspect-arrested; Stephen 
Satterly, School Kidnapping Case Ends in Sentence, SAFE HAVENS INT’L (July 22, 2014) 
http://safehavens international.org/school-kidnapping-case-ends-sentence/. 
 113  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 
552 (1975); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-64, 178 
(1951); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385, 394 (1914). 
 114  See C.Y. ex rel. Antone v. Lakeview Pub. Sch., 557 F. App’x 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(stating due process fundamentally includes an opportunity to be heard); see also Seal v. 
Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 573 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating procedural due process is “often 
summarized as ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard’”). 
 115  See Antone, 557 F. App’x at 430 (stating that so long as the student is told what the 
offense was and given an opportunity to respond to the accusation, a school will have met its 
requirements under the Due Process Clause); see also Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 
1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 116  C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 386 (11th Cir. 1996). Now imagine if a judge were to say 
that at an arrestee’s initial hearing. 
 117  Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see Ellis, supra note 76, at 423.  
 118  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(e).  
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student says, and the administrator gets to decide which story he or she believes 
more.119  
As professional colleagues, school administrators are partial to the judgment of a 
teacher.  When a parent challenges a teacher’s judgment, teachers are more likely to 
support their colleague rather than question their colleague’s judgment.120 The entire 
process is far from a real truth-seeking process. It is a quick means to a quicker 
end.121 Accordingly, while students do not shed their constitutional rights at the 
school house gate, those rights are truncated in the name of school convenience and 
discretion.122   
While not saying what the hearing should be, the majority in Goss did state that 
the hearing would not be a “full-fledged, trial-type evidentiary hearing.”123 The 
Court reasoned that school disciplinary actions are numerous enough that requiring a 
full trial-type hearing would overwhelm the administration so severely that the cost 
of protecting students from arbitrary actions would greatly outweigh the benefit 
students could receive.124 Essentially, the majority stated that “full-fledged” trial 
formalities were unnecessary to comport with student due process rights because, 
based on balancing student interests with faculty needs, the faculty’s need for 
efficiency and expediency is a more compelling interest.125    
This outcome is concerning on several levels. First, it is not within the spirit of 
the law to deprive a single person of his or her constitutional rights in the name of 
efficiency. The Bill of Rights enumerates the most basic human rights that are not to 
be taken away without serious scrutiny and legitimate justification.126 Mere 
efficiency is not a legitimate justification. In fact, the legislative history of the Fourth 
                                                          
 119   “The rudimentary procedures provided in Goss, where the student’s only defense 
would be his own testimony, with no right to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses, to 
call his own witnesses, or to present other evidence, do not appear to [be truly meaningful.]” 
Ellis, supra note 76, at 423-24. 
 120  “We promised [the parent] we would not be judgmental or take any of her comments 
personally.  (That can get difficult when a parent attacks you or a member of your staff . . . )” 
How I Handled . . . A Parent Who Thought Her Son’s Suspension Was Unfair, EDUC. WORLD, 
http://www.educationworld.com/a_admin/ how_i_handled/how_i_handled015.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2016).   
 121  See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see also Ellis, supra note 76, at 423; Henry J. Friendly, 
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1275-76 (1975); Note, Specifying the 
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1527 (1975). 
 122  See Ellis, supra note 76, at 423. 
 123  Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see Ellis, supra note 76, at 423. 
 124  “Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and 
adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy 
its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see also Ellis, supra 
note 76, at 424. 
 125  Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.  
 126  “The Bill of Rights is a list of limits on government power. For example, what the 
Founders saw as the natural right of individuals to speak and worship freely was protected by 
the First Amendment.” Bill of Rights of the United States of America, BILL OF RIGHTS INST. 
(1791), http://www.billofrights institute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/. 
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Amendment shows how the Founders were opposed to efficiency as a justification 
for taking away rights.127 The Fourth Amendment was created specifically as a way 
to prevent general search warrants, which were used for efficiency and 
convenience.128 The existence of the Fourth Amendment reasons that efficiency is 
not an adequate justification for depriving a person of their rights without due 
process.129 In schools, however, it apparently is.130    
Second, the Court created a dangerous precedent that permits binding a certain 
class of people and denying them meaningful due process without any rational 
public reason other than somehow regarding them as inferior. When a statute binds a 
class of people in this way, not only is it arbitrary, but it is invidious, and the Court 
will strike it down.131 The Court strikes these statutes down for lacking public reason 
for a public good, and thus, violations of the basic principle of legality that laws not 
be arbitrary.132 If denying students meaningful due process was intended to somehow 
protect the public, then permitting such arbitrary exclusions from school does not 
meet those ends whatsoever.133 In fact, it most likely does the opposite because 
students subject to arbitrary discipline become confused, angry, and distrusting of 
authority.134   
                                                          
 127  See U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION, FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1992) 
[hereinafter GPO, FOURTH]. 
 128  Id.; see also QUINCY’S MASSACHUSETTS REPORTS, WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 1761-72, App. 
I, 395-540; 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 106-47 (Wroth & Zobel eds., 1965); OLIVER M. 
DICKERSON, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: STUDIES INSCRIBED TO EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE 40 (R. Morris ed., 
1939). 
 129  GPO FOURTH, supra note 127. 
 130  Compare GPO FOURTH, supra note 127, with Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. 
 131  See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 303-04 (1993); see also 
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91-92 (1971); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 
(1942). 
 132  “[T]o the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and 
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-04 (1965). 
 133  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); see generally Why Some Schools 
Want To Expel Suspensions, NPR (June 2, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/06/02/188125079/why-some-schools-want-to-expel-suspensions 
[hereinafter NPR]. 
 134  ““All the research says that [being suspended] contributes to [students’] disengagement 
from school.” NPR, supra note 133. “Not only has she lost faith in school officials, Cortes 
said, but so has her 15-year-old son, who struggled to wrap his head around the idea that he 
was being punished for possibly saving someone’s life last week.” Peter Holley, The 
‘Infuriating’ Saga of the Texas Teen Suspended After Rescuing a Classmate, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/01/27/the-
infuriating-saga-of-the-eighth-grader-suspended-after-rescuing-an-asthmatic-classmate/. 
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C. Some Kind of Discrimination 
This is not the first time students—or juveniles—have been grouped together, 
deemed as inferior, and subjected to discrimination. In 1964, a fifteen-year-old 
Arizona boy was arrested for making “lewd phone calls.”135 At the delinquency 
hearing, the boy did not have an attorney, his accuser was not present, no witnesses 
were sworn in, and no transcript was made.136 At the close of the hearing, the boy 
was ordered to confinement at the State Industrial School until he turned twenty-
one.137 Because Arizona did not permit appeals in juvenile cases, the boy’s parents 
filed a habeas petition for the boy’s release, which was dismissed.138 The parents 
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and heard the case of In 
re Gault in 1967.  
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded and held that minors adjudicated in 
the juvenile court system were entitled to the same level of due process as adults in 
the criminal court system.139 Respondents argued that juvenile courts existed to help 
children, not to punish them, and that this difference meant that full due process 
rights were not necessary.140 The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that although 
the two court systems served different purposes, a juvenile’s liberty was as much at 
stake in a juvenile delinquency hearing as an adult’s liberty in a criminal case.141 
Accordingly, the Court held that juveniles are not different as a class of people and 
are entitled to a fair trial. 142 
A few years after Gault in the case of In re Winship, the Court held that the 
burden of proof in delinquency cases be equal to the burden in adult criminal 
cases.143 New York’s juvenile code set the burden of proof for delinquency hearings 
to a preponderance of the evidence.144 A juvenile judged delinquent appealed, 
arguing that juveniles, like adults, were entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
when charged with a violation of criminal law.145 New York argued that the state 
was not denying juveniles their constitutional rights because juvenile adjudications 
                                                          
 135  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 3-6 (1967). 
 136  Id. at 7. 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id.  
 139  Id. at 57-59; see Janet Friedman Stansby, In Re Gault: Children Are People, 55 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1204 (1967). 
 140  Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-15. 
 141  See, e.g., Curtis C. Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A. J. 
719, 720 (1962) (“The basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to custody. He has the right 
to have someone take care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial privilege, 
the law must do so.”). 
 142  Gault, 387 U.S. at 57-59. 
 143  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1970). 
 144  Id.; N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).  
 145  Winship, 397 U.S. at 375-76. 
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are not convictions that affect any rights or privileges, the proceedings are not 
criminal, and delinquency status itself was not a crime.146    
The Court rejected that argument and held that juveniles were no less vulnerable 
to “dubious and unjust convictions with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and 
property” than adults in the criminal system.147 The Court reasoned that the 
constitutional rights guaranteed to secure a fair trial were the very root of the judicial 
system and no “civil labels and good intentions” could obviate the need for full due 
process rights in juvenile courts.148   
The Gault and Winship decisions both acknowledged that juvenile status does not 
justify truncation of due process rights when life, liberty, or property is at stake.149 
However, just five years after the Winship case, Goss held that status as a juvenile is 
a justification to truncate juveniles rights when their property interest in attending 
school is threatened.150 The Goss majority reasoned that affording full due process 
rights during a disciplinary hearing was unreasonable because the extra time taken to 
provide students with proper hearings would interfere with the efficient and smooth 
functioning of a school.151 However, Winship expressly rejected that argument, and 
the Court stated that full due process rights in juvenile adjudications would not 
disturb the state’s juvenile court system, “nor will there be any effect on the 
informality, flexibility, or speed of the hearing at which the factfinding takes 
place.”152 Goss took a step back, ignoring the Gault and Winship line of cases which 
establish that juveniles as a class are entitled to full due process rights.153 
Accordingly, Goss permitted discrimination against a class of people for no other 
reason than somehow deeming them as inferior.154 Arguably, Goss opened the door 
for future invidious acts that permit similar discrimination.155   
D. Discipline Goes Beyond the Classroom 
A discussion of the scope of the effect that disciplinary actions have on students 
outside of school was notably missing from Goss’s majority and dissenting opinions. 
On the surface, a school suspension is an insignificant moment on a person’s path to 
adulthood and becomes irrelevant once the student finishes school. As it turns out, 
however, student disciplinary records that include punishments as “severe” as an 
                                                          
 146  Id.; see also W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1969). 
 147  Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-63 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 
(1895)). 
 148  Id. at 364-65. 
 149  See id.; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57-59 (1967). 
 150  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); see also Larry Bartlett & James 
McCullagh, Exclusion from the Educational Process in the Public Schools: What Process is 
Now Due, 1993 BYU EDUC. & LJ. 1, 1 (1993). 
 151  Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. 
 152  See id.; see also Winship, 397 U.S. at 366. 
 153  Friedman, supra note 95, at 166-68. 
 154  But see Glenn W. Soden, Constitutional Law: Student Rights Under the Due Process 
Clause . . . Suspensions from Public Schools, 8 AKRON L. REV. 570, 574 (1975). 
 155  Ellis, supra note 76, at 430. 
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out-of-school suspension or expulsion do not lose their relevance after graduation; 
they do not remain within the walls of the school.156 Some college applications, 
scholarships, and even the Character and Fitness Questionnaire for the Bar Exam 
require the disclosure of school suspensions.157 Severe disciplinary actions could 
cause an individual to be denied admission into college or denied scholarship funds 
to pay for college if he or she were admitted.158   
This matters because it puts students at a disadvantage in a society that so greatly 
values higher education.159 In a country that has turned away from the manufacturing 
industry and towards the service industry, the public hears almost daily that everyone 
should go to college and every child should seek higher education.160 Accordingly, if 
higher education is as important as the public is told, why is it okay that this 
important component of future success be jeopardized by a single administrator’s 
discretion and a poorly written code of conduct?161  
When a person’s liberty is at stake, due process affords the accused protections 
from arbitrary actions and provides the accused with a fair trial.162 Due process 
                                                          
 156  Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75. 
 157  See Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Most Colleges Weigh Student Discipline Records in 
Admissions, EDUC. WEEK (May 29, 2015), http://www.edweek.org/ew/ 
articles/2015/05/29/most-colleges-weigh-student-discipline-records-in.html. Furthermore, the 
Common Application, which is accepted, preferred, or even required by many universities, 
insists on disclosure of school suspensions or expulsions. THE COMMON APPLICATION, 
https://www.commonapp.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 158  “The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be 
free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed 
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to 
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any 
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all 
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful 
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.” Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
Arguably, a student denied admission to college or funds to pay for school are not free to 
pursue any livelihood or lawful calling.    
 159  “The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge 
as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); see also HARVARD UNIV., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 
OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE vii (2000). 
 160  Stephanie Ebbs, First Lady Michelle Obama Raps ‘You Should Go to College,’ ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lady-michelle-obama-raps-
college/story?id=35689604; Mark Gongloff, Why You Should Really Go To College, In 2 
Charts, HUFFPOST BUS. (updated Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/20/ 
college-income-premium_n_6720902.html; College for All: Is Obama’s Goal Attainable, 
NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com /id/29445201/n s/us_news-
education/t/college-all-obamas-goal-attainable/#.Vq-ob7IrKM8. 
 161  Such administrative discretion could include personal animosity towards a student for 
previous behavioral issues.   
 162  See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (describing writ as “bulwark against convictions that 
violate ‘fundamental fairness’”); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“[D]enial of 
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means the accused knew which behaviors were prohibited.163 It also means that the 
accused was able to comply with the law and was not subject to an arbitrary 
command that made the accused guilty from the start.164 Due process acknowledges 
the values, norms and rules by which a person as a human being should be treated 
and respects them.165 Yet, when a child’s future is at stake, Goss’s due process 
provides no protection from arbitrary actions.166 If the United States is a nation of the 
rule of law, not men, then why does it permit the rule of men to hold a child back 
from his or her full potential? Children who are suspended from school are twice as 
likely to drop out of high school, and students who drop out are three times as likely 
to one day become incarcerated.167 This relationship is known as the school-to-prison 
pipeline.168 Thus, a suspension from school has real ramifications for that child as it 
could set him on a destructive path that could ultimately lead to prison.169   
Furthermore, subjecting these children to arbitrary discipline can create feelings 
of distrust and antagonism towards authority figures or even prevent these students 
from wanting to help people in the future for fear that their involvement could be 
punished.170 For example, on January 14, 2016, Hugo Marquez, a student at an 
Oklahoma City school, was suspended until the end of May for defending a friend 
during a fight.171 In a cellphone video of the incident, Marquez is seen walking 
                                                                                                                                         
due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of 
justice.”). 
 163  “In some instances, however, school policies are overbroad or unclear, and students 
may not know they are violating school rules.” Gesaman, supra note 90. 
 164  See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1965). 
 165  Charles, supra note 38, at 477-502; BARNETT, supra note 39, at 73.  
 166  See Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 935 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 
Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2007); Miller v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 588 
F.Supp.2d 606, 628 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 167  See, e.g., Augustine Reyes, The Criminalization of Student Discipline Programs and 
Adolescent Behavior, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 73, 95 (2006) (explaining that by 
sending adolescents to county detention centers and juvenile, county, or municipal courts for 
behavior issues like dress code violations and food fights, schools are criminalizing irksome 
juvenile behavior and prepping students for the school to prison pipeline); Daniel J. Losen, 
Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s 
Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 257 (2004) (describing how adult prisons 
and juvenile justice systems are stocked with black youths who fell into a school-to-prison 
pipeline).  See also COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, Abandoned in the Back Row: New Lessons 
in Education and Delinquency Prevention (2001), http://chhi.podconsulting.net/assets/ 
documents/news/Final%20Jena%20Testimony.pdf.  
 168  COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 167. 
 169  See Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment: 
Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 341, 342-43 (2003). 
 170  Sheldra Brigham, “I Guess I Got Knocked Out,” Oklahoma City High School Student 
Responds to Viral Fight Video, KFOR NBC NEWSCHANNEL4, http://kfor.com/2016/01/14/i-
guess-i-got-knocked-out-oklahoma-city-high-school-student-responds-to-viral-fight-video/ 
(last updated Jan. 14, 2016). 
 171  Id. 
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towards the fight and standing with his hands in his pockets in between his friend 
and the aggressor.172 While Marquez stands between the two other boys, the 
aggressor punches Marquez in the face hard enough that Marquez falls and lays on 
the ground unconscious.173 In an interview for Oklahoma City’s local NBC News 
affiliate, Marquez stated that he regrets getting involved in the fight because now no 
one is standing up for him.174 Because Marquez tried to stand up for a friend and 
peacefully end a fight, he might not graduate as planned in May.175 This disciplinary 
action sent mixed messages to Marquez because now, due to this suspension, he no 
longer sees the value in getting involved.176 Suspension taught this student that he 
should remain a passive bystander.177   
Unfortunately, Marquez is not alone. On January 25, 2016, Anthony Ruelas, a 
Texas student, was suspended from school for helping a classmate who was having 
an acute asthma attack, which the school qualified as “disobeying a teacher.”178 The 
teacher acknowledged the girl’s asthma attack and emailed the school nurse per 
school policy.179 While the teacher waited for a response, the girl fell to the floor in 
extreme distress.180 Upon seeing this, Ruelas refused to allow the teacher to wait any 
longer.181 He picked up the girl and carried her directly to the school’s main office.182 
And what did the school do? It suspended him for disobeying his teacher’s orders to 
let this girl writhe on the floor in severe distress while the teacher waited for the 
                                                          
 172  Dallas Franklin, 5 Students Arrested After Brutal Fight is Caught on Camera at 
Oklahoma City High School, KFOR NBC NEWSCHANNEL 4, 
http://kfor.com/2016/01/13/increased-police-presence-at-oklahoma-city-high-school-after-
brutal-fight-is-caught-on-camera/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2016). 
 173  Id.  
 174  Brigham, supra note 170. 
 175  Id.  
 176  “Yeah, and it’s not really cause [sic] I got knocked out. The fact that everybody left 
after they seen how I was. No one helped me up.” Id.  
 177  “Threats of severe punishments, such as suspensions . . . may actually discourage 
children and adults from reporting bullying that they observe.” Misdirections in Bullying 
Prevention and Intervention, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/prevention/in-
the-community/community-action-planning/misdirections-in-prevention-tipsheet.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 178  Teen Suspended for Helping Friend Won’t Return to School, ABC NEWSNET 5 
CLEVELAND, http://www.newsnet5.com/news/national/teen-suspended-for-helping-friend-
wont-return-to-school (last updated Jan. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Teen Suspended]; Holley, 
supra note 134.  
 179  Teen Suspended, supra note 178; Holley, supra note 134. 
 180  “The way he talks about Trishica’s asthma attack—the little things he says, like how 
she was grasping [sic] for air, the way her body was moving—it really scared him.” Holley, 
supra note 134. 
 181  “When he saw a life possibly slipping away, he reacted instinctively, his mother said. 
It’s possible, she said, that her son understood what was going on better than his teacher: He 
has two cousins with asthma, one of whom slipped into a coma after a severe asthma attack.” 
Id. 
 182  Id.  
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nurse to respond to the email.183 In a statement, the school said they “applaud[] the 
efforts of students who act in good faith to assist others in times of need.”184 And 
what better way to show its appreciation than by suspending this boy from school.   
These scenarios are all made possible by Goss, an opinion that fails to show any 
understanding of the true significance that school disciplinary actions can have on a 
person outside of the school. To its credit, the Court did address possible reputation 
damage or emotional distress that severe disciplinary actions could have on a 
student.185 However, this minor discussion failed to truly explore the impressionable 
and delicate psyche of a child because—after all—these are children, and they might 
not be able to process such conflicting messages.186 
Furthermore, the Justice Powell’s dissent goes so far as to state that any arbitrary 
actions could be remedied within the school and not through the judicial system.187 
Justice Powell’s statement was incorrect because a quick glance at the case law that 
has piled up in the wake of Goss would show that many arbitrary actions still take 
place which are not remedied within the school.188 As it turns out, it is nearly 
impossible for a student to remedy an arbitrary action at all because the courts are 
still reluctant to intervene in an area where almost all discretion has been given to 
schools to make their own decisions.189   
In order to remedy an arbitrary action, a student must appeal the suspension to 
the school board, which, similar to a court, might be reluctant to substitute its 
discretion for that of the school principal.190 If, and basically when, the 
administration upholds the action, the only other option would be to take the school 
to court. As Goss established, schools only violate student rights if they fail to 
provide this minimal notice and subpar hearing.191 Disciplinary actions short of 
                                                          
 183  “Within minutes [Ruelas] had been written up . . . and [Ruelas’s mother] received a call 
from school officials telling her that her son had been suspended for walking out of class.” Id. 
Now imagine if dialing 911 included a delay similar to the delay created by the policy at this 
school. 
 184  Teen Suspended, supra note 178. 
 185  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
 186  Meg Wagner, Ohio Teen Commits Suicide After School Staffers Accused Him of 
Smelling Like Pot at Homecoming Dance, Friend Says: ‘He Was Directly Told That He had 
Ruined His Life,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ohio-teen-
kills-school-officials-verbal-attack-article-1.2388707 (last updated Oct. 7, 2015). 
 187  Goss, 419 U.S. at 594. 
 188  The substantial amount of case law does not account for situations involving arbitrary 
discipline that did not make it to court for financial or personal reasons.  
 189  See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985); Bd. of Curators 
of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1978); Goss, 419 U.S. at 585-86 (1975) 
(Powell, J., dissenting).  
 190  OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015); see Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 
2007); Grine v. Sylvania Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. L-04-1137, 2004 WL 2924335 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 17, 2004); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Revere Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 20275, 
2001 WL 489980, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2055 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 191  OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 (2015); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985); 
Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. 
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involving physical abuse that would shock the conscious are foolproof and 
practically guaranteed to be upheld.192   
Now, going back to Susy’s suspension, Goss established that Susy has a property 
interest in attending school. Because the U.S. Constitution protects Susy from 
deprivation of property without due process of law, the school cannot deprive Susy 
of her equal access to public education without due process. Here, due process 
consists of notice and a hearing described in Goss. Susy’s school provided her with 
notice. The school informed Susy as to the reason for her suspension. Susy’s school 
also provided her with a hearing. The administration gave her an opportunity to be 
heard by requiring her to make a statement, which was supposedly read by the 
principal. Because the school provided notice and a hearing consistent with the 
requirements in Goss, the school provided due process of law. Therefore, Susy’s 
property interest in attending school was not arbitrarily deprived without due process 
of law. Accordingly, the school’s disciplinary action did not violate any of Susy’s 
civil rights. Thus, Susy has no legal claim to support her feeling that the suspension 
was inherently wrong. 
V. STUDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO MEANINGFUL DUE PROCESS 
Because Goss is not protecting students as intended, there needs to be legislative 
intervention. Specifically, the state legislatures need to establish a model student 
code of conduct that properly defines what the prohibited behaviors are. The notice 
requirement of Goss, while noble, mostly fails due to the lack of uniformity, 
specificity, and clarity in student codes of conduct.193 “Goss notice” lacks any 
protective power because it only requires schools to justify and tell students of the 
reason for suspension, but the standard does not require the reason to be 
legitimate.194 Any behavior that a staff member finds objectionable could be legally 
punishable so long as the school can fit that behavior into one of several ambiguous 
categories of prohibited conduct.195   
Currently, each school district has a different code of conduct that, while 
prohibiting mainly the same types of behaviors, fails to provide adequate notice of 
what the prohibited behaviors truly are. Some banned behaviors like “gambling” are 
well defined in that students have adequate notice that they are prohibited from 
“engaging in any games of chance.”196 However, while some schools define 
gambling as engaging in a game of chance, others schools include possession of 
playing cards and dice under “gambling” because they are “gambling paraphernalia” 
                                                          
 192  See generally Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994); B.B. v 
Appleton Area Sch. Dist., No. 12-C-115, 2013 WL 3972250, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107392 
(E.D. Wis. 2013). 
 193  See generally Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982). 
 194  Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.  
 195  Id. at 574 (conceding that the state’s authority to prescribe standards for discipline is 
very broad).  
 196  GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY, supra note 100; HAMILTON 
TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100; IRONTON HIGH SCHOOL 
STUDENT/PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100; MARIETTA HIGH SCHOOL HANDBOOK, supra 
note 100; REVERE HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 100. 
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or could potentially “facilitate gambling.”197 While it is true that playing cards could 
potentially facilitate gambling, the concept of gambling facilitation is not, by nature, 
within the scope of mere possession of playing cards.198 For such a small topic, the 
school districts have managed to include a wide range of behavior for which a 
student could face suspension. Accordingly, a model code of conduct that uniformly 
defines prohibited behaviors would drastically improve the efficacy and protection 
of notice contemplated in Goss.199 
Returning to the headlines from the beginning of this Note, many of those 
children would not have been suspended for those particular behaviors had schools 
actually given adequate notice to students as to which behaviors were prohibited 
beforehand. For the student who purchased “sugar crack,” while the administration 
believed she had purchased drugs or drug paraphernalia, she did not actually 
purchase drugs.200 She bought a bag of sugar and Kool-Aid powder that other 
students referred to as “happy crack” because sugar allegedly makes children 
hyperactive.201 Instead of suspending this student, the school could have used the 
situation as a learning experience to teach students that drugs need to be taken 
seriously and that they should not jokingly apply the names of narcotics to every day 
substances. If the school still felt it necessary to punish the student for possessing a 
bag of sugar, a detention would have sufficed. It would have gotten the school’s 
point across without potentially affecting this child’s future. She did not need to miss 
school over a bag of sugar.  
The Goss hearing requirement also needs legislative intervention, as it is frankly 
worthless. The school only is required to hear what the student says and not actually 
                                                          
 197  GREENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY, supra note 100. 
 198  Upon searching “why can’t you have playing cards in school” on Google, the author 
finds a Yahoo Answers conversation in which a teacher asks the general public why they think 
playing cards are banned in school because the teacher “need[s] a good reason to tell my 
students.” The teacher clearly does not see supposed inherent questionable nature of playing 
cards, and based on the answers, neither does the general public. d dawg, Why is Playing 
Cards in Class/School Bad? YAHOO ANSWERS 
https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080529201022AApDYRN (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2016). Another page asks the public to debate whether or not Pokémon Cards should 
be allowed in schools because, apparently, Pokémon Cards are also a topic of contention. 
Should Pokemon Cards be Allowed in Schools?, DEBATE.ORG, 
http://www.debate.org/opinions/should-pokemon-cards-be-allowed-in-schools (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2016). 
 199  Section 3313.666 of the Ohio Revised Code is an example of a state law which guides 
school districts in the creation of their conduct policies. Under R.C. § 3313.666(B), schools 
are required to implement a policy that prohibits the harassment, intimidation, or bullying of 
another student on school grounds, on a school bus, or any school-sponsored event. This law 
is specific without tying the hands of school administrators. While many school districts 
include a detailed harassment policy pursuant to this law, many other schools remain in 
violation because there is no government body to monitor the contents of these codes of 
conduct. The violations are only discovered when a private party looks into it. OHIO REV. 
CODE § 3313.66 (2015). 
 200  Bash, supra note 1. In an interview with News Channel 5, the eighth grade student said 
she had never seen cocaine before and that the substance the students called “happy crack” 
was just sugar and Kool-Aid which was consumed by licking it off their finger.  
 201  Id. 
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investigate the matter further.202 The fact that this procedural requirement pits a 
student’s word against a staff member means that the student almost always will 
lose.203 Because exclusion from school does not magically become irrelevant upon 
graduation, exclusion needs to be taken more seriously, and students need more 
procedural safeguards than just the opportunity to be heard. The legislature needs to 
mandate procedures that force school administrators to consider the whole student 
and not just whatever incident landed him or her in the principal’s office. Students 
should be permitted to argue their side of the story. If that means other students 
making statements as witnesses, then so be it because possible exclusion is 
extremely serious.  
Furthermore, students deserve impartial appellate panels. As of now, Ohio’s state 
law only mandates that there be an appeals process beyond the initial disciplinary 
hearing.204 This typically amounts to a student making a statement either in front of 
the superintendent and two board members or to three local board members.205 
Similar to the “opportunity to be heard” standard at the disciplinary level, this appeal 
will typically be fruitless because, again, why would local board members believe 
this student’s word against what staff and the principal believe happened.206 The 
legislature needs to mandate that the appeals hearings for disciplinary actions 
consider the whole student as well. Again, if this means student witness statements 
or even other staff members making statements in support of the student’s character, 
then so be it. Such additions to hearing procedures would not unduly burden school 
administrators because it only requires a few additional precautions before formally 
excluding a student from school. The minimal hearing that administrators are 
required to hold now does not consider how this exclusion from school could affect a 
student’s future.207 They are only thinking of the present circumstances.  
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As a further procedural safeguard, students need to have the opportunity to 
appeal their disciplinary action outside of the local school system before seeking 
judicial intervention. This could be accomplished by establishing an additional level 
of appeals at the county level or state board of education. Again, this additional level 
of appeals should permit the student to have the chance to make a real case for what 
happened and how the exclusion unfairly burdens him or her as opposed to another 
“opportunity to be heard.” Students have the opportunity to be heard. What they do 
not have is the opportunity to have their statements be taken seriously and for their 
disciplinary actions to be scrutinized by an impartial third party.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Goss ultimately created a no-win situation for students when it tried to protect 
them. One concern addressed in Justice Powell’s dissent was that this notice and 
hearing requirement laid out in the majority opinion was so ambiguous that it did not 
amount to any protection at all.208 Justice Powell, as it turned out, was rightly 
concerned. “Some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing” have been the central 
issues surrounding Goss, and their practical application has not lead to any 
substantive protection of student interests.   
 The Goss Court sought to create further protections for students while not 
impinging on the discretion given to school administrations. However, while trying 
not to tie the hands of administrators, the Goss Court undermined the rights of 
students and truncated the civil rights they are entitled to while in school. While it is 
understandable that the Court did not want to unduly burden educational quality and 
efficiency, it still should not have done so by truncating students’ right to due 
process. The majority believed that the students’ rights were not as important as the 
faculty’s needs, but because school disciplinary actions can follow a person into 
adulthood just like a criminal record, students should be afforded the full protections 
afforded to those in the criminal justice system.209   
Many of Goss’s shortcomings could be solved—or at the very least lessened—
with legislative intervention. Notice could be improved if legislatures were to create 
uniform codes of conduct that adequately defined prohibited behaviors in a way that 
gave meaningful notice to students beforehand as well as taking some of the 
arbitrary discretion away from staff members. The hearing requirement could be 
fixed if the legislature implemented procedural protections that more closely 
mirrored the protections enjoyed by those in the criminal justice system, such as the 
right to put on a real, meaningful case, confront the accuser, and present evidence 
and witnesses. Furthermore, students would benefit if their appellate hearings had 
more procedural safeguards akin to the criminal justice system. And finally, there 
needs to be an additional level of appeal before a student must turn to the justice 
system for relief. 
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In conclusion, although Goss tried to help students, it ultimately failed. Until 
state legislatures implement more procedural safeguards, we are doing a disservice 
to our students by subjecting them to the proverbial mine field that is “being a 
student.”   
 
 
 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/9
